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RECENT DECISIONS
subject to rescission by the infant or, in the event of his death prior
to attaining his majority, by his personal representative. That this
is a well-known principle of law cannot be denied. 4 The law, how-
ever, distinguishes between the rights and duties of infants in civil
life and those enlisted in the military service. An enlistment is more
than a mere contract. It effects a change of status,5 the infant be-
coming emancipated from the control of his parents, and, so long as
he remains in the service, is amenable to the military law.0 The
Congress intended under the Act and itsamendments to extend to
minors as well as adults who served in the armed forces of the United
States all of the rights and privileges of the Act, and to subject them
to all of the conditions and limitations contained therein.7 The age
at which persons shall be deemed competent to do any acts or per-
form any duties depends wholly upon the Legislature.8  The insur-
ance policy provided that it was subject in all respects to the provi-
sions of the Act creating it, of any amendments thereto, and of all reg-
ulations thereunder all of which, together with the application, formed
the contract of insurance. 9 The Secretary of the Treasury was
granted power under Section 13 of the Act to make and change regu-
lations governing the administration of the law and pursuant to such
authority determined that the contract of insurance shall lapse and
terminate upon written request for cancellation from any policy
holder.10 By virtue of his change of status the rescission of the
policy by the emancipated minor was valid and binding and the
judgment for plaintiff was rightfully reversed.
M.F.
CONTRACT OF SALE-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-ACCEPTANCE AND
RECEIPT BY VENDEE IN POSSESSlON.-Plaintiff let an apartment to
defendant and in addition to the apartment the lease included, among
other furnishings, three pairs of draperies valued at $150. While de-
fendant was still in possession of the draperies, he orally asked plain-
tiff if he would sell the draperies and plaintiff consented by saying:
"Very well, the draperies are yours." On the day designated for
payment of the purchase price defendant refused to perform where-
upon plaintiff brought this action for breach of contract. Defendant
'Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., Inc., 273 U. S. 18, 47 Sup. Ct. 265 (1926);
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schiavone, 71 F. (2d) 980 (App. D. C. 1934).
In re Grimley, 137 U. S. 147, 11 Sup. Ct. 54 (1890) ; In re Morrisey, 137
U. 5. 157, 11 Sup. Ct. 57 (1890).
aUnited States v. Reaves, 126 Fed. 127 (C. C. A. 5th, 1903) ; In re Scott,
144 Fed. 79 (C. C. A. 9th, 1906).
'Von Der Lippi-Lipski v. United States, 4 F. (2d) 168 (App. D. C. 1925).8 Wassernan v. Feeney, 121 Mass. 93 (1876).
'White v. United States, 270 U. S. 175, 46 Sup. Ct. 274 (1926); Lynch
v. United States, 292 U. S. 571, 54 Sup. Ct. 840 (1934).
" Treasury Decision No. 48, Sept. 29, 1919.
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moved for dismissal on the ground that the oral contract was unen-
forceable by reason of the Statute of Frauds.' Plaintiff contended
that no writing was necessary since there had been an acceptance and
receipt of the draperies. On appeal, held, complaint dismissed. No
such acceptance and receipt as would satisfy the Statute of Frauds is
shown. Maher v. Randolph, 275 N. Y. 80, 9 N. E. (2d) 786 (1937).
The rule in New York, prior to the adoption of the Uniform
Sales Act in 1911, was settled that the mere words of the bargain
are not sufficient evidence to satisfy the statute in a case where the
buyer already has possession of the goods under some prior and in-
dependent transaction of the parties.2 This rule has not been altered
by our adoption of the Uniform Sales Act for if such was the inten-
tion of the legislature they would have said so in an unmistakable
manner.3 The New York courts are stringent in laying down the
rule as to what constitutes acceptance and receipt.4  The statute is
judicially interpreted as intending to exclude the possibility of either
party creating the evidence which shall prove the oral contract as
against the other.5 Receipt implies delivery; 6 delivery that passes
possession from seller to buyer pursuant to the new transaction.7 This
is so even where, in addition to retaining possession, the buyer has
pasted labels containing his name as owner on the articles after the
alleged oral contract of sale.3 A literal adherence to these definitions
would lead to the rather roundabout result of a buyer in possession
under a prior transaction retransferring possession to the seller so
that the seller might in turn make a new delivery pursuant to the
oral contract of sale. As an alternative to effecting these numerous
IN. Y. PEgs. PROP. LAW § 85, subd. 1: "A contract to sell or a sale of any
goods or choses in action of the value of fifty dollars or upwards shall not be
enforceable by action unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods * * * and
actually receive the same * * *, or unless some note or memorandum in writing
of the contract or sale be signed by the party to be charged or his agent in that
behalf."
'Schindler v. Houston, 1 N. Y. 261 (1848); Rodgers v. Phillips, 40 N. Y.
519 (1869) ; Marsh v. Rouse, 44 N. Y. 643 (1871); Hawley v. Keeler, 53
N. Y. 114 (1873) ; Young v. Ingalsbe, 208 N. Y. 503, 102 N. E. 590 (1913);
Dorsey v. Pike, 50 Hun 534 (N. Y. 1889).
'Instant case at p. 84.
'Rodgers v. Phillips, 40 N. Y. 519 (1869); Hawley v. Keeler, 53 N. Y.
114 (1873). The term acceptance is adequately defined in the Uniform Sales
Act and in New York it is found in N. Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 85, subd. 3. The
different views of the several states is caused by the interpretation of what
constitutes an actual receipt within the meaning of the statute. For majority
view see note 14, infra, and for New York view note 2, supra.
'Hinchman v. Lincoln, 124 U. S. 38, 8 Sup. Ct. 369 (1888) ; Schindler v.
Houston, 1 N. Y. 261 (1848).
' Cooke v. Millard, 65 N. Y. 352 (1875); Broom v. Joselson, 211 App. Div.
157, 206 N. Y. Supp. 841 (lst Dept. 1924) ; Dehority v. Paxson, 97 Ind. 253
(1884).
'Linde v. Huntington, 37 Misc. 212, 75 N. Y. Supp. 161 (1902).
'Young v. Ingalsbe, 208 N. Y. 503, 102 N. E. 590 (1913).
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changes of possession there may be a symbolic delivery, e.g., a key,9
bills of lading,10 warehouse receipts," or other evidence of title.12
This hard and fast New York rule has not escaped severe criticism
from eminent writers 13 and the majority of our sister states 14 who
hold that acceptance by word or conduct, by a vendee in possession
under some prior and unrelated transaction, constitutes such an ac-
ceptance and receipt as contemplated by the statute.
On analysis, it appears that the New York rule more effectively
closes the door to the opportunities of fraud. If a buyer in possession
desired to secure the owner's property he could, by his own acts, show
an acceptance and satisfy the statute even though the owner had never
offered his goods for sale. Similarly could an owner of goods perjure
himself to the extent of saying that the buyer in possession had orally
or by conduct, accepted the goods thus effectuating a valid sale there-
of to the buyer who had never intended to purchase.15
With the preceding situations in mind, the New York courts
have limited the menacing possibilities of perjury and misunderstand-
ings-thus carrying out the avowed purpose of the Statute of Frauds.
H. G. V.
CORPORATION-SUBSCRIPTION AGREEMENTS-MARTIN ACT.-
The plaintiff entered into a subscription agreement with the defendant
corporation whereby the plaintiff subscribed to thirty units of the
'Wilkes v. Ferris, 5 Johns. 335 (N. Y. 1810) (key to warehouse where
goods were stored).
"Rodgers v. Phillips, 40 N. Y. 519 (1869).
'Whitlock v. Hay, 58 N. Y. 484 (1874).
" Jones v. Reynolds, 120 N. Y. 213, 24 N. E. 279 (1870) (on the oral sale
of an unpatented device acceptance of and receipt of a model thereof held suffi-
cient to satisfy the statute); see (1935) 20 CORN. L. Q. 226; 2 WxiisToN,
CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 559.
BROWNE, STATUTE OF FRAUDS (5th ed. 1895) § 322; BuRD cK, A STATUTE
FOR PROMOTING FRAUD (1916) 16 COL. L. REv. 273; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
(1932) § 202, subd. (lb) Illus. 3; 2 WLISToN, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936)
§ 554.
'Wilson v. Hotchkiss, 171 Cal. 617, 154 Pac. 1 (1915) ; Devine v. Warner,
75 Conn. 375, 53 Atl. 782 (1903); Raldne Realty Corp. v. Brooks, 281 Mass.
233, 183 N. E. 419 (1932); Kenesaw Mill & Elevator Co. v. Aufdenkamp, 106
Neb. 246, 183 N. W. 294 (1921); Moore v. State, 118 Okla. 69, 246 Pac. 404
(1926); Mack Co. v. Bear River Milling Co., 63 Utah 565, 227 Pac. 1033
(1924); Snider v. Thrall, 56 Wis. 674, 14 N. W. 814 (1883). For English
view see Edan v. Dudfield, 1 Q. B. Rep. 302 (1841).
' These examples are suggested from a close reading of the cases cited in
note 2, supra.
'This statute is New York's Blue Sky Law. Blue Sky Laws: Laws that
have been enacted for purpose of protecting the public "against the imposition
of unsubstantial schemes and the securities based upon them", deriving their
name from the fact that they are aimed at "speculative schemes which have no
more basis than so many feet of blue sky". BouviER's LAw DICTIONARY (Library
ed. 1928).
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